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Abstract We explore the interdependence of leverage and debt maturity choices in Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and unregulated listed real estate investment companies
in the U.S. for the period 1973-2011. We find that the leverage and maturity choices of
all listed real estate firms are interdependent, but in contrast to industrial firms, they are
not made simultaneously. Across the different types of real estate firms considered, we find
substantial differences in the nature of the relationship between leverage and maturity.
Leverage determines maturity in non-REITs, whereas maturity is a determinant of leverage
in REITs. We suggest that the observed differences reflect the effects of the REIT regulation,
rather than solely being a function of real estate as the underlying asset class. We also present
novel evidence that the relationship between leverage and maturity in both firm types can
be used to moderate the effects of other exogenous financing policies.
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1 Introduction
Capital structure arguably plays a unique role in the real estate investment industry due
to the suitability of the underlying assets as debt security and the special tax treatment
afforded to REITs. A substantial body of literature explores the determinants of leverage
and debt maturity in listed real estate firms in isolation.1 However, with the exception of
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Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans (2008), little research focuses on the multidimensionality
of capital structure choices in the real estate industry. When a firm decides to issue debt,
the maturity of the debt contract has to be determined simultaneously. We explore the joint
leverage and maturity choices of REITs and comparable non-regulated real estate firms,
focussing especially on the effect of the REIT regulation on the interdependence between
leverage and maturity choices.
Capital structure theory does not clearly predict the nature of the interaction between
leverage and maturity choices in REITs and comparable unregulated real estate firms. We
argue that, in the presence of corporate taxes, non-REITs prioritise the choice of an optimal
target level of leverage following the trade-off theory. Optimal maturity is then a monotonic
function of leverage, chosen to reduce cost of debt and refinancing risk, consistent with
Alcock, Finn, and Tan (2011) who argue that firms determine the maturity of a debt is-
suance only once they have decided to issue debt. Conversely, we argue that REITs, that are
generally exempt from corporate taxation, prioritise the maturity choice, following Leland
and Toft (1996), and then determine the corresponding value-maximising level of leverage.
We assess the empirical evidence for the hypothesised difference in the joint leverage and
maturity decisions of REITs and comparable unregulated listed real estate firms.
Giambona et al (2008) also study the joint determination of leverage and maturity in
REITs. They find that leverage and maturity are simultaneously determined and utilised as
substitutes to mitigate underinvestment, consistent with Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003).
Giambona et al (2008) thus establish a fundamental difference between the capital structure
choices of REITs and industrial firms. The latter group of firms appears to employ leverage
and maturity as complements to reduce refinancing risk, in line with Johnson (2003).
However, the reason for this observed difference between industrial and real estate firms
is unclear. REIT capital structure choices may be inconsistent with those of industrial firms
due to the characteristics of real estate as the underlying asset class. In this case, we expect
REITs and non-REITs to behave alike in the joint determination of leverage and maturity.
Alternatively, the regulatory status of REITs, especially the tax exemption, may be the key
driver, as taxes are crucial in traditional capital structure theory. If this were the case, then
we expect see REITs and comparable non-REITs make capital structure decisions differently
from each other.
In order to provide robust empirical evidence for the hypothesised relationships between
leverage and maturity choices in REITs and non-REITs, we need to address two potential
endogeneity issues. The joint determination of leverage and maturity introduces a simul-
taneity bias. We mitigate this problem by adopting an instrumental variable approach and
estimate a 2SLS system of equations for leverage and maturity. In addition, a firm’s choice
of corporate structure (REIT vs/ non-REIT) may also be endogenously determined. We
identify the effect of REIT status on the interdependence between leverage and maturity by
employing a modified difference-in-differences (DD) estimator in connection with the 2SLS
estimation.
We find that, in contrast to industrial firms, REITs and non-REITs do not appear to
determine leverage and maturity simultaneously and thus do not seem to employ these two
dimensions of capital structure as complements or substitutes. We suggest that leverage and
maturity can only be chosen simultaneously when other incentives to prioritise one of the
choices exactly offset each other. Within the real estate sector, the drivers of capital structure
choices, and especially the interrelationship between leverage and maturity, reflect the effects
of the REIT regulation and the exemption from corporate taxation. Leverage determines
maturity in non-REITs, in line with Alcock et al (2011), whereas maturity is a determinant
of leverage in REITs, consistent with Leland and Toft (1996). Overall, the REIT status
appears to free up scope in the capital structure to pursue more offensive strategies, such
as signalling firm quality to the market and optimising transaction costs, while non-REITs
largely seem to focus on defensive objectives such as the mitigation of tax, agency costs
and refinancing risk. We also present novel evidence that the relationship between leverage
and maturity in both firm types can be used to moderate the effects of exogenous financing
policies.
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We review related literature in Section 2. Section 3 provides details on data, identification
strategy and methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
Leland and Toft (1996) examine the optimal capital structure of a firm that can choose
leverage and maturity. They argue that optimal leverage is a function of firm risk, ex-
pected bankruptcy costs and maturity. Indirectly they argue that firms choose maturity
first, then determine the corresponding value-maximising level of leverage. The optimal,
value-maximising leverage ratio increases with maturity. Alcock et al (2011) argue that
firms determine leverage first, and then choose the corresponding most cost-efficient term
to maturity. The relative economies that can be achieved by issuing longer-maturity debt
increase with the pre-issuance level of leverage. Barclay et al (2003) propose that leverage
and maturity can act as substitutes to mitigate the underinvestment problem. Empirically,
Johnson (2003) finds that leverage and maturity are complements to reduce refinancing
risk. Existing theory does not offer explicit guidance on the expected relationships between
leverage and maturity in real estate firms. Empirical research into this question is sparse. A
notable exception is Giambona et al (2008) who study joint leverage and maturity choices
in REITs. They find that leverage and maturity appear to be substitutes in the sense of
Barclay et al (2003).
The interest in real estate and especially REIT capital structure choices is partly fuelled
by the fact that the major traditional theories of corporate leverage are not easily applicable
to real estate firms and especially to REITs. Trade-off theory posits a value-maximising debt
ratio where the marginal bankruptcy costs and tax benefits of debt are equal.2 However,
REITs are exempt from corporate tax if they distribute 90% of taxable income as dividends,
which nullifies tax shields and some agency costs of debt. Howe and Shilling (1988) assert
that in the absence of tax benefits, REITs cannot compete for debt and will favour equity.
Shilling (1994) argues that REIT value is maximised for equity-only financing. Consistently,
Ghosh et al (1997) find that REITs raise more capital through seasoned equity than debt.
Boudry et al (2010) find that REITs are less likely to issue debt when bankruptcy costs
are high and interpret this as support for the trade-off theory. Brown and Riddiough (2003)
present evidence in support of the view that, consistent with the existence of an optimal
leverage ratio implied in trade-off theory, REITs appear to target a certain leverage ratio.
However, this strategy appears to be motivated by the maintenance of an investment-grade
rating.
Pecking order theory3 claims that capital structure changes reflect a need for external
funds given the higher informational sensitivity and thus adverse selection costs of equity.
Boudry et al (2010) argue that REITs especially are a fairly transparent investment ve-
hicle as they focus on cash yields and stable cash flows from the operation of real estate,
questioning the existence of asymmetric information. On the other hand, Han (2006) argues
that accurate real estate valuation requires sophisticated local knowledge, increasing infor-
mation asymmetry. Pecking order also assumes discretion over earnings, debt and equity.
However, REIT pay-out requirements restrict funding choices to debt and equity. Accord-
ingly, Boudry et al (2010) find no evidence for pecking order in REIT financing choices.
Nevertheless, several studies confirm the negative price and valuation effects of equity is-
sues implied in pecking order (Brounen and Eichholtz, 2001; Ghosh et al, 1999, 2000; Howe
and Shilling, 1988). Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) show that REITs balance the lack of
incentive for debt and the adverse selection cost of equity.
Research into maturity choices in real estate is sparse. Howe and Shilling (1988) find
REIT stock prices increase after short-term debt issues. This finding is consistent with the
signalling hypothesis proposed in Flannery (1986) who develops an inverse relationship be-
tween debt maturity and firm quality. High quality is signalled through issuing short-term
2 Variations are explored in DeAngelo and Masulis (1980); Jensen (1986); Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)
and Modigliani and Miller (1963).
3 See e.g. Donaldson (1961); Myers (1984); Myers and Majluf (1984); Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
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debt to exploit favourable refinancing terms. Brown and Riddiough (2003) find a negative
relationship between REIT debt maturity and credit ratings. This result resonates the liq-
uidity risk theory (Diamond, 1991; Sharpe, 1991; Titman, 1992) that predicts an inverse
relationship between credit rating and debt maturity as lower-rated firms attempt to avoid
risky refinancing events. Highfield et al (2007) find little evidence for signalling and liquidity
risk in REITs but confirm the influence of personal taxes and agency problems.
On balance, many of the existing capital structure theories are not fully applicable to the
special circumstances of REITs. In fact, theory predicts that REITs should not use lever-
age at all. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that REITs typically carry significant levels of
leverage. Most of the existing research on the capital structure of REITs therefore focuses
on analysing leverage choices. When maturity choices are considered, then typically in iso-
lation and rarely in conjunction with leverage decisions. We contribute to the literature by
providing additional insight into the joint determination of leverage and maturity in REITs
and comparable non-REITs.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data and proxies
We study all firms that form part of the real estate industry in the Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) system. We form three major groups, i) REITs (SIC 6798), ii) real
estate firms that perform services comparable to REITs (same line of business, SLOB, firms
from SIC 651), and iii) other real estate firms that provide different services (non-SLOB
firms, SIC 1531, 653, 654, 655). We begin our sample in 1973, the first year for which
Compustat has complete debt maturity data, and end in 2011. We replicate our analysis
for the sub-periods before (1973 to 2006) and during (2007 to 2008) the global financial
crisis. Our final sample for the main study period (1973 to 2011) consists of 1,586 firm-year
observations.
We measure leverage as the ratio of total debt (long-term debt plus current liabilities) to
market value of assets (book value of assets less book value of common equity plus market
value of common equity), consistent with Billett, King, and Mauer (2007); Datta, Iskandar-
Datta, and Raman (2005); Stohs and Mauer (1996). We use the ratio of long-term debt
(debt due after three years) to total debt as our proxy for maturity (Barclay et al, 2003).
The measurement of debt maturity varies in the literature, but fortunately with little impact
on empirical results (Scherr and Hulburt, 2001). We consider a comprehensive set of control
variables commonly employed in the capital structure literature. Table 1 outlines our control
variables and their proxies. The proxies follow the suggestions of the original authors where
possible. All firm data is obtained from Compustat. Bond yields have been obtained from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s Economic Database. All variables except earnings
volatility and abnormal earnings are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the year in
which leverage and maturity are measured (Billett et al, 2007; Datta et al, 2005; Johnson,
2003).
In contrast to Giambona et al (2008) we employ different measures for debt and asset
maturity. We include a time series of earnings volatility (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984),
rather than a single average value. We also control for debt rating (Diamond, 1991; Sharpe,
1991; Titman, 1992) and include operating loss carry-forward and investment tax credit
dummies (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) as proxies for the trade-off theory. Lastly, we lag all
our independent variables (Billett et al, 2007; Datta et al, 2005; Johnson, 2003).
3.2 Identification strategy
We aim to isolate the effect of the REIT status on capital structure choices and especially on
the relationship between leverage and maturity decisions. We analyse the joint leverage and
maturity choices in a pair of simultaneous equations to account for endogeneity. We estimate
the system using 2SLS, consistent with Barclay et al (2003); Giambona et al (2008); Johnson
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(2003). In order to identify the REIT effect, we cannot simply pool REITs and comparable
non-REITs and test the significance of an interaction term between the indicator variable
for REITs with maturity (leverage) in the leverage (maturity) equation, as REIT status
may also be endogenously determined. However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature
generally offers no guidance on suitable instruments for the REIT status choice. In order to
mitigate this endogeneity bias, we adopt a modified difference-in-differences (DD) approach
and incorporate this into the 2SLS system.
The DD technique is used to identify the treatment effects of changes in the firm’s
economic or institutional environment (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan, 2003; Card and Krueger, 1994; Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2011; Roberts
and Whited, 2011). The approach combines the comparison of the conditional expectation
of the outcome variable in the treatment group before and after treatment with that of a
control group before and after the date of the treatment. The DD estimator thus creates an
intermediate counterfactual outcome that helps separate the treatment effect on the depen-
dent variable from variation in this variable that would have happened even in the absence
of treatment, for instance due to an exogenous time trend that affects the treatment and
control groups equally.
We replace the time dimension typically considered in DD studies with a distinction
between firms along their line of business. We assume that this distinction is exogenous,
which seems reasonable since the business activity of a firm is chosen before the firm is
founded and typically remains the same throughout the life of the firm. We choose this
distinction on the basis of the assumption that REITs and comparable non-REIT firms
(same line of business, SLOB, firms) are essentially identical, except for the REIT status
and potentially a set of observable characteristics that we control for in our regression. We
create dummy variables denoting the group to which a firm belongs, REIT = 1 for REIT
firms, SLOB = 1 for REIT firms (except mortgage REITs) and SLOB firms. Then, RE is
the default group for other non-SLOB firms. This set-up produces four combinations of firm
type indicators.
Dummy variables REIT non-REIT
SLOB 1-1 1-0
Other RE (non-SLOB) 0-1 0-0
A typical equity REIT is in category 1-1 as it provides a REIT-type service and operates
under the REIT regime. A SLOB firm provides a comparable service but operates outside the
REIT regime, resulting in category 1-0, a mortgage REIT is in category 0-1, and Other RE
firms that provide a different service such as developers are in category 0-0. These categories
produce the following combinations of coefficients in a regression of an outcome y on firm
types, with Other RE as the base category, that is y = β0 + β1REIT
∗SLOB + β2REIT +
β3SLOB + residual.
Coefficients REIT non-REIT Difference
SLOB β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 β0 + β3 β1 + β2
Other RE (non-SLOB) β0 + β2 β0 β2
Difference β1 + β3 β3 β1
The double-difference coefficient β1 captures the net effect of REIT status after controlling
for the line of business. Roberts and Whited (2011) discuss the DD method as a way of
addressing common endogeneity issues in detail. Other observable controls that may differ-
entiate firms and affect the outcome can be added to the equation. We then estimate the
2SLS system for leverage (LEV ) and maturity (MAT ):
LEVit = β0 + β1REIT
∗SLOB∗MATit (1)
+ β2REITit + β3SLOBit + β4MATit + β
′
5CTRLit + uit
MATit = γ0 + γ1REIT
∗SLOB∗LEVit (2)
+ γ2REITit + γ3SLOBit + γ4LEVit + γ
′
5CTRLit + ηit
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We interact the variable that produces the true effect of REIT status (REIT ∗SLOB) with
maturity and leverage, respectively. A significant coefficient β1 (γ1) in the leverage (matu-
rity) equation is then evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the joint determination
of leverage and maturity differs between REITs and non-REITs as a result of the REIT
regulation. The matrix CTRL contains the control variables outlined in Table 1.
We are careful not to include controls that may themselves by affected by the REIT
status, such as dividend policy, potentially rendering them endogenous. We include year
fixed effects in the maturity equation to control for latent macroeconomic factors. The uit
and ηit are normal residuals. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
In order to explore the relationship between leverage and maturity for SLOB firms, we
repeat the 2SLS regressions above, but exclude REITs (categories 1-1 and 0-1). Given our
assumption of exogeneity, the ‘line of business effect’ can be captured by pooling SLOB
and RE firms and assessing the significance of the interaction between SLOB and LEV
(MAT ) in the maturity (leverage) equation. The comparison of the results from the es-
timation including REITs and the estimation excluding REITs allows us to contrast the
nature of the interrelationship between leverage and maturity in the two firm types. We
expect REIT ∗SLOB∗MAT to be positively related to REIT leverage, and SLOB∗LEV to
be positively related to maturity for SLOB firms. As before, standard errors are clustered
by firm.
Lastly, we separate REIT from non-REIT firms to explore the influence of other factors
commonly reported in the capital structure literature. This step allows us to explore the
potential wider consequences on capital structure policies of the interrelationships between
leverage and maturity in REITs and non-REITs in more detail. Our results are qualitatively
similar when controlling for mortgage REITs as well as for SIC categories 1531, 653, 654,
and 655. We estimate the systems for leverage (LEV ) and maturity (MAT ):
LEVit = β0 + β1MAT + β
′
2CTRLit + uit (3)
MATit = γ0 + γ1LEV + γ
′
2CTRLit + ηit (4)
Again, we estimate our regressions using 2SLS with standard errors clustered by firm, rather
than 3SLS. Empirical evidence for the interdependence of leverage and maturity appears to
be sensitive to model specification (Barclay et al, 2003; Giambona et al, 2008). If both
equations are misspecified because a variable that affects leverage and maturity has been
omitted, this produces cross-equation correlation of residuals, suggesting that 3SLS may be
more efficient. However, specification errors in one equation may be propagated through the
3SLS system. Limited-information estimators such as 2SLS confine a specification problem
to the equation in which it occurs (Greene, 2002). Given the uncertainty surrounding the
preferable specification, we choose to employ 2SLS.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 2 (Table 2) shows the distribution of debt maturity between 1973 to 2010
for REITs (non-REITs). REITs tend to borrow longer term than non-REITs, suggesting
better access to long-term debt or fewer refinancing risks for REITs. The distribution of
REIT debt maturity is highly left-skewed whereas the distribution for non-REITs appears
almost uniform.
Panel B of Tables 2 (REITs) and 2 (non-REITs) presents descriptive statistics for all
variables over the study period. According to simple t -tests, the mean firm value for REITs
($1,822m) is statistically larger than that for non-REITs ($701m). Average REIT debt
maturity and leverage are significantly higher for REITs than for non-REITs (61% and 45%
relative to 49% and 41%, respectively).
REITs have average asset maturity of 24 years, similar to that of non-REITs (20 years),
but both are higher than for industrial firms at 12 years (Billett et al, 2007), consistent
with the notion that the useful life of real estate assets is relatively long. REIT growth
opportunities (1.26) are lower than for non-REITs (1.31). Lower growth opportunities in
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REITs, which are generally viewed as value-stocks, might suggest that some aspects of debt-
equity agency conflicts are of lesser concern. REIT earnings volatility (0.04) is significantly
lower than for non-REITs (0.06). This is consistent with the view that REITs focus on stable
income streams from the operation of real estate (Boudry et al, 2010).
In our empirical analysis we subdivide non-REITs into firms that provide services com-
parable to those of REITs (SLOB firms from SIC 651 Real Estate Operators (except De-
velopers) And Lessors) and other real estate firms. We also account for mortgage REITs.
To minimise any undue influence of outliers, we winsorise all variables at the 1st and 99th
percentiles.
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix among the measures of all dependent
and independent variables for the period of 1973 to 2010. The matrix generally shows low
levels of correlation between most independent variables. The definition of the indicator
SLOB = 1 for REITs (except mortgage REITs) and SLOB firms, may have introduced a
certain degree of multicollinearity with the REIT indicator. However, the sample correlation
is low (0.3658).
4 Results
4.1 The interrelationships between leverage and maturity
Table 4 shows the 2SLS results for the REIT and SLOB effects on leverage and maturity.
We focus our discussion on the coefficients of the REIT and SLOB indicators and their
interactions with leverage and maturity. The control variables outlined in Table 1 are in-
cluded in the estimation but not shown. Previously observed differences in capital structure
choices of REITs and industrial firms seem only partly related to the nature of real estate as
the underlying asset class. Its effect appears to be such that neither REITs nor comparable
non-REITs determine leverage and maturity simultaneously. However, the drivers of capital
structure choices in REITs and non-REITs, and particularly the interdependence between
leverage and maturity, differ between the two firm types, reflecting the effects of the REIT
status.
For REITs, the coefficient on the interaction term REIT ∗SLOB∗MAT is significant in
the leverage equation, but REIT ∗SLOB∗LEV is insignificant in the maturity equation.
REIT leverage seems negatively related to maturity, but not in reverse. The unidirectional
nature of the relationship suggests that REITs determine maturity exogenously and then
choose the corresponding leverage. The inverse direction of this relationship contradicts Le-
land and Toft (1996), a result we examine below. The lack of evidence for simultaneity sug-
gests that REITs use the leverage and maturity dimensions of capital structure for different
purposes rather than regarding them as complements or substitutes. We find that non-REIT
maturity is positively related to leverage, as the coefficient on the interaction SLOB∗LEV is
significant in the maturity equation. Non-REITs appear to prioritise the leverage choice and
then determine the corresponding debt maturity. The positive sign supports the hypothesis
that, for a given level of leverage, non-REITs choose maturity to reduce expected costs of
debt in the sense of Alcock et al (2011). Again, non-REITs appear to employ leverage and
maturity for different purposes.
We suggest that leverage and maturity may only be chosen simultaneously if the incen-
tives for prioritising the determination of one dimension over the other exactly offset each
other. Only in this case would a firm be able to view leverage and maturity as complements
or substitutes, depending on other firm-specific characteristics. Our results suggest that non-
REITs have an incentive to choose an optimal target level of leverage first, followed by the
determination of a corresponding level of maturity.
Regulated REIT firms do not appear to have an a priori preference for a specific debt
level, hence optimal maturity is chosen first, and leverage follows. Our results are consistent
with the hypothesis that the regulatory and tax situations of a firm influences the incentives
for prioritising leverage over maturity choices or vice versa.
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REITs appear to lack an explicit incentive to optimise the amount of leverage. In the
absence of corporate tax liabilities, there are no opportunity costs of foregoing tax shield
benefits of debt. The costs of inappropriate leverage choices seem less severe than for non-
REITs. It appears that the trade-off between marginal tax benefits and marginal direct
bankruptcy costs that traditionally is a strong motivator of leverage choices is minimal for
REITs. REITs appear to be free from any tax- and bankruptcy cost-related constraints
to choosing a certain optimal level of leverage and can hence focus on optimal maturity
first. Given that leverage should be of lower importance for REITs, the mitigation of costs
associated with sub-optimal levels of maturity is prioritised in the absence of corporate
taxation.
Non-REITs seem to have an incentive to optimise the amount of leverage first in order to
fully exploit the tax shield benefits of debt. The costs of an inappropriate leverage decision
seem more severe than those of a sub-optimal maturity choice. In other words, the costs
associated with foregoing some of the tax benefits of debt or, correspondingly, the risk of
incurring higher bankruptcy costs, seem to weigh heavier then the costs associated with an
inappropriate maturity choice. The consequences of inappropriate maturity, namely higher
cost of debt, are not completely ignored. Non-REITs appear to manage the costs of inappro-
priate maturity, but only subject to an optimal level of leverage. The mitigation of the costs
associated with inappropriate levels of leverage appears to be prioritised by firms liable to
corporate taxation.
Unlike Giambona et al (2008), we do not find evidence for simultaneity in REIT choices
of leverage and maturity. This difference may be due to the fact that we consider REIT
status to be a choice variable and adapt our empirical identification strategy to be robust
to this additional source of a potential endogeneity bias.
4.2 The impact of the global financial crisis
Our empirical results are robust to focussing on the sub-period prior to the global financial
crisis. The relationships between leverage and maturity in the two firm types are consistent
with those found for the full study period. However, our findings suggest that REITs carried
more leverage than comparable unregulated real estate firms in the period 1973-2006. This
result is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that REITs typically hold more debt than
theory would predict.
During the global financial crisis (2007-2008), the relationships established between lever-
age and maturity in the two firm types seem to disappear. This finding is consistent with the
commonly expressed view that funding liquidity during the global financial crisis reduced
sharply. It seems intuitive that the subtle interrelationship between leverage and maturity
choices cannot be maintained in an economic climate characterised by severe supply side
constraints on funding availability.
Our results also suggest that REITs maintained higher levels of leverage and shorter debt
maturities than their unregulated counterparts during the global financial crisis. Our finding
is consistent with Barclay and Smith (1995) who argue that regulated firms can borrow longer
term debt because they face fewer debt-related agency problems. The regulation of REITs
appears to help manage refinancing risk. Our finding also seems intuitively consistent with
the view that regulation increases firm transparency and that lenders are especially sensitive
to potential agency conflicts with borrowers in an economic situation when funding capacity
is restricted.
4.3 Links to other drivers of capital structure choices
Table 5 shows the leverage and maturity choices of REITs and non-REITs for the full
study period. REITs appear to follow the pecking order to secure the cheapest funds (Feng,
Ghosh, and Sirmans, 2007; Giambona et al, 2008). However, firm size carries an unexpected
positive sign, suggesting that the lack of transparency in real estate as an asset class (Han,
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2006) generates the asymmetric information that underlies the pecking order theory. This
problem is likely to be exacerbated for larger REITs, possibly with a diversified asset base.
The information asymmetry resulting from the detailed local market knowledge required
to accurately value real estate assets appears to be a strong driver of capital structure in
spite of the regulatory pay-out requirement that restricts discretion over retained earnings,
normally a crucial assumption of pecking order.
We also find support for the signalling hypothesis, as abnormal earnings carry a positive
sign and are highly significant (Howe and Shilling, 1988). REITs seem to signal their quality
to the market by issuing more debt when mimicking this strategy is too costly for poor-
quality firms. Further, REITs seem to employ leverage choices to mitigate growth- and
volatility-related agency costs of debt. However, REITs employ only the leverage dimension
of capital structure for the mitigation of growth-related agency costs. In contrast, they
employ both dimensions to mitigate volatility-related agency costs. Boudry et al (2010)
argue that REITs are generally characterised by stable cash flows as they focus on the yield
from operations. Earnings volatility seems a strong driver of capital structure choices, as it
stands in contrast to the typical REIT business model.
Non-REITs appear to adhere to the trade-off theory, as operating losses carried forward
and investment tax credit are significant in the determination of leverage. Consistent with
Johnson (2003), the operating losses carried forward dummy has a positive sign. The evidence
for the trade-off theory is consistent with the positive relationship we find between leverage
and maturity. Further, growth opportunities and highly volatile earnings induce a reduction
in non-REIT leverage so as to mitigate agency costs of underinvestment as well as bankruptcy
costs and agency costs of debt in the sense of Bradley et al (1984). In line with Harris
and Raviv (1990) and Williamson (1988), our findings suggest that non-REITs with higher
proportions of tangible assets carry more debt as they tend to have higher liquidation values.
Managers respond to perceived investor preferences to use debt to generate information
about when liquidation is more lucrative than ongoing operations as well as to monitor
management. We find no support for the more offensive signalling theory (Flannery, 1986;
Ross, 1977).
REIT maturity choices do not seem to adhere to the asset matching principle. The
argument put forward in Kolb (1987) implies that a looser observation of the matching
principle indirectly acts as a tool to mitigate refinancing risk. This argument is in line with
the finding that REITs do not appear to feel the need to match maturity to their chosen
level of leverage so as to (indirectly) reduce refinancing risk. However, we find support for
the size- and transaction cost-based theory of debt maturity (Titman and Wessels, 1988).
Larger REITs choose maturity so as to exploit economies of scale and optimise transaction
costs. This last insight allows us to explain the unusual inverse relationship between REIT
maturity and leverage.
If REIT size increases, both maturity and leverage increase, maturity by a transaction
cost argument, and leverage by the pecking order argument. So, for a one unit increase in
firm size, REITs will eventually hold more debt and this debt is longer term. The increase
in maturity is not unwelcome, but in the absence of corporate taxes REITs do not have an
incentive to use that much debt (Feng et al, 2007). It appears that REITs aim to benefit
from lower transaction costs that result from larger firm size if managers subsequently in-
crease maturity, but limit the increase in leverage resulting from the stronger information
asymmetry - a by-product of larger firm size.
The simultaneous increase in leverage and maturity overcorrects the capital structure
with regard to what is required to mitigate the information asymmetry resulting from larger
firm size. Leverage can then be reduced, conserving the beneficial impact of higher maturity
on transaction costs. This strategy is predicated on the lack of any a priori preference for
a target debt level of REITs; leverage can be adjusted as a function of a variety of factors.
In the Leland and Toft (1996) framework, firm value also depends on bankruptcy costs. For
REITs, the reduction in leverage is still in line with their rationale, only that in this particular
instance, firm value is maximised by reducing leverage relative to maturity through reducing
bankruptcy costs.
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Non-REIT maturity choices appear to be mainly driven by asset-matching and the link
to leverage. These two findings are directly related. According to Kolb (1987), a strict obser-
vation of the matching principle implies a current ratio of one, thereby increasing refinancing
risk during times of limited debt availability. Firms observing the leverage-maturity rela-
tionship put forward in Alcock et al (2011) will also benefit from increased protection from
credit supply shocks. Firms that are at greatest risk from credit supply shocks are those
that are highly levered with substantial short-term debt. If firms with high leverage follow
the ‘default-risk’ theory, they will choose long-term debt and so reduce refinancing risks.
In addition, consistent with a number of single-equation US debt maturity studies, in-
cluding Barclay and Smith (1995); Datta et al (2005); Johnson (2003) and Billett et al
(2007), credit rating is a significant predictor for non-REIT maturity. Non-REITs also ap-
pear to employ maturity to mitigate volatility-related agency costs of debt. Overall, real
estate companies appear to pursue a rather defensive maturity strategy to ensure funding
liquidity and manage refinancing risk as well as agency costs.
Contrary to Hart (1993), non-REIT maturity choices seem positively related to the
market-to-book ratio. We interpret this as a direct result of the interaction between leverage
and maturity, and it also appears to be the one instance in which we find non-REITs to
pursue a more offensive capital structure strategy, albeit indirectly. Consistent with theory
and as reported above, we find support for an inverse relationship between non-REIT growth
opportunities and leverage so as to mitigate agency costs of underinvestment. However, we
also find evidence that, once leverage decreases, non-REITs shorten maturity accordingly so
as to reduce expected costs of debt and refinancing risk in the sense of Alcock et al (2011).
Leverage and maturity can be substitutes in the management of the underinvestment
problem (Barclay et al, 2003). Given the positive relationship between leverage and maturity,
non-REIT capital structure would naturally tend to over-correct maturity with respect to
growth opportunities if both dimensions of capital structure were to be reduced. If this over-
correction is allowed to run its course, firms find themselves with low levels of leverage but
also with unnecessarily short maturities. There are two main risks surrounding unnecessarily
short maturities, refinancing risk (the risk of not obtaining new funding) and transaction
costs involved in sourcing new funding. Refinancing risk is mitigated through the leverage-
maturity relationship. Non-REITs only use short-maturity debt if their leverage levels are
sufficiently low. Therefore, given that refinancing risk is controlled, non-REITs have an
opportunity here to indirectly reduce transaction costs in the sense of Titman and Wessels
(1988) by swapping short-term debt for equity.
Overall, the capital structure choices of REITs appear to be more offensive than those of
non-REITs as the regulatory setting renders the mitigation of corporate taxation obsolete,
reduces agency conflicts, helps manage refinancing risk and thus frees up flexibility in the
capital structure to signal firm quality and optimise transaction costs. This interpretation is
consistent with Alcock, Glascock, and Steiner (2012) who argue that REITs opportunistically
employ leverage to enhance performance measures. Our results suggest that the relation-
ship between leverage and maturity can also be used to moderate the effects of exogenous
financing policies.
5 Summary and conclusion
In this study, we focus on the joint determination of leverage and maturity in real estate
firms. Previous research indicates substantial differences in the relationship between leverage
and maturity for REITs versus industrial firms. We compare the capital structure choices
of REITs and non-REITs so as to contrast the effects of real estate as the underlying asset
class versus those of regulation and taxation.
We find that the difference in capital structure choices between REITs and industrial
firms is only partly due to the underlying asset class. The effects of the REIT regulation
have a significant impact on capital structure choices. Further, we find that simultaneous
determination of leverage and maturity may only be possible when the incentives to prioritise
the choice of one dimension over the other exactly offset each other. In the presence of
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corporate taxation, non-REITs prioritise the choice of an optimal target level of leverage.
For REITs, there is no incentive to prioritise the leverage choice, so they appear to focus
on maturity. Our results also suggest that, in addition to the interpretation of leverage
and maturity as substitutes or complements, the relationship between the two dimensions
of capital structure can also be used to moderate the effects of other exogenous financing
policies.
Overall, REITs seem to use the leverage dimension of capital structure to follow the
pecking order and secure cheaper funds, to actively signal firm quality and to mitigate
growth- and especially volatility-related agency costs. Equity-related agency costs explain
the inverse relationship between leverage and maturity. REIT maturity choices appear to be
mainly targeted at mitigating underinvestment problems and exploiting economies of scale.
Unregulated real estate companies on the other hand have a higher exposure to debt-related
agency costs and are therefore more defensive in their capital structure. In line with the trade-
off theory, they focus on the mitigation of corporate taxes, which implies that they prioritise
the choice of a target level of leverage. This finding is consistent with the positive relationship
we confirm between leverage and maturity. Non-REITs appear to largely tailor their capital
structure choices to the timely provision of funding for new projects, the management of
debt-related agency costs and the reduction of refinancing risk for a chosen level of leverage.
Howe and Shilling (1988) argue that REITs cannot compete for debt as they cannot
benefit from the tax shields offered by interest payments. It has long puzzled researchers why
REITs still use debt, and in some cases substantially higher leverage ratios than unregulated
real estate companies. Our findings suggest that the regulatory setting and tax-exempt status
of REITs provides sufficient flexibility in the capital structure to exploit the benefits of a
more offensive financing strategy and to offset the comparatively higher net cost of debt.
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6 Figures and Tables
Control variables and proxies
Proxies for leverage hypothe-
ses
Theory Reference
Maturity (share of total debt ma-
turing in more than 3 years)
Maturity determines leverage to
maximise firm value
Leland and Toft, 1996
Alternative tax shields (dummies
for tax credits and loss carry for-
ward, 1 in presence of alternative
tax shield)
Trade-off theory DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980
Growth opportunities (market to
book)
Mitigate agency costs of underin-
vestment
Myers, 1977
Firm size (log of market value of
the firm)
Static pecking order (information
asymmetry)
Myers and Majluf, 1984
Profitability (EBITDA to book
value of assets)
Dynamic pecking order Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Ma-
jluf, 1984
Firm quality (abnormal earnings) Signalling Ross, 1977
Fixed assets ratio (NPPE to book
value of assets)
Information extraction Harris and Raviv, 1990;
Williamson, 1988
Volatility of earnings (stdev. of 1st
diff. in EBITDA over 4 yrs.)
Credit risk Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984
Proxies for maturity hypothe-
ses
Theory Reference
Leverage (total debt to market
value of assets)
Leverage determines maturity to
reduce costs of default and refi-
nancing risk
Alcock, Finn and Tan, 2010
Asset maturity (log of gross depre-
ciable property to depreciation ex-
pense)
Asset-matching principle Myers, 1977
Growth opportunities (market to
book)
Mitigate agency costs of underin-
vestment
Hart, 1993
Firm quality (abnormal earnings) Signalling Flannery, 1986
Firm size (log of market value of
the firm)
Transaction costs Titman and Wessels, 1988
Volatility of earnings (stdev. of 1st
diff. in EBITDA over 4 yrs.)
Credit risk Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984
Debt rating (dummy, 1 in presence
of debt rating)
Liquidity risk Diamond, 1991; Sharpe, 1991; Tit-
man, 1992
Term structure (10-yr. vs. 6-month
government bond)
Tax benefits Brick and Ravid, 1985
Table 1 The table shows the control variables and their proxies/measurements included in our study. Bond yields
have been obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s Economic Database. We include year dummy
variables in the debt maturity regression to control for the effects of latent macroeconomic event shock factors.
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> 2 years 0.71 0.28 0.00 0.59 0.81 0.91 1.00
> 3 years 0.61 0.29 0.00 0.44 0.68 0.85 0.99
> 4 years 0.54 0.29 0.00 0.33 0.61 0.78 0.95
> 5 years 0.47 0.29 0.00 0.22 0.51 0.74 0.92
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics
Std.
Characteristic Mean Dev. Min 25th 50th 75th Max
Firm Value ($mil) 1822*** 3,153 3.70 99.35 389.63 1972 18837
Debt Maturity 0.61*** 0.29 0.00 0.44 0.68 0.85 0.99
Leverage 0.45*** 0.23 0.01 0.28 0.44 0.60 0.93
Log of Asset Maturity 3.19** 0.95 0.33 2.87 3.18 3.79 5.16
Market-to-book 1.26 0.36 0.64 1.02 1.25 1.44 2.59
Abnormal Earnings 0.15 0.85 -1.16 -0.03 0.01 0.05 5.66
Log of Firm Value 6.03*** 1.95 1.93 4.45 5.99 7.58 9.82
Earnings Volatility 0.04*** 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.25
Term Structure 1.57 1.23 -1.39 0.83 1.65 2.58 3.42
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.56*** 0.29 0.00 0.39 0.63 0.80 0.95
Profitability 0.08 0.06 -0.09 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.28
Proportion of firm-years with
Operating Loss Carryforwards 0.18** 0.38
Investment Tax Credit 0.23 0.42
Debt Rating 0.21*** 0.41
> 2 years 0.59 0.30 0.00 0.36 0.63 0.86 1.00
> 3 years 0.49 0.30 0.00 0.22 0.49 0.77 0.99
> 4 years 0.41 0.30 0.00 0.14 0.38 0.67 0.97
> 5 years 0.35 0.28 0.00 0.08 0.30 0.58 0.94
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics
Std.
Characteristic Mean Dev. Min 25th 50th 75th Max
Firm Value ($mil) 701 2,202 0.63 23.98 89.14 320 25002
Debt Maturity 0.49 0.30 0.00 0.22 0.49 0.77 0.99
Leverage 0.41 0.23 0.01 0.24 0.41 0.58 0.86
Log of Asset Maturity 2.99 0.93 0.53 2.39 3.10 3.56 5.38
Market-to-book 1.31 0.78 0.56 0.91 1.05 1.39 5.14
Abnormal Earnings 0.04 0.78 -3.12 -0.07 0.01 0.07 5.04
Log of Firm Value 4.69 1.95 0.95 3.19 4.53 5.83 9.91
Earnings Volatility 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.37
Term Structure 1.48 1.29 -1.80 0.58 1.62 2.53 3.44
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.37 0.29 0.00 0.08 0.31 0.63 0.95
Profitability 0.07 0.10 -0.27 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.33
Proportion of firm-years with
Operating Loss Carryforwards 0.28 0.45
Investment Tax Credit 0.15 0.36
Debt Rating 0.12 0.33
Table 2 The table reports distribution of corporate debt maturity in Panel A (Panel C) and descriptive statistics in Panel B (Panel D) for 1385 firm-year observations of Real Estate Investment
Trusts, REIT, and (Non-REIT) between 1973 and 2011 from Compustat Database, respectively. Non-REITs are firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 6500 to 6552.
Variables are defined as: Debt Maturity is measured by the proportion of debt maturity due in more than three years. Leverage is the ratio of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current
liabilities) to market value of assets, where market value of assets is estimated as book value of total assets less book value of common equity plus market value of common equity. Log of Asset
Maturity is measured by the natural logarithm of the ratio of depreciable assets to depreciation. Market-to-book is measured by the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets.
Abnormal Earnings is the difference between earning per share in year t+1 minus earnings per share in year t, divided by the year t share price. Log of Firm Size is measured by the natural
logarithm of the market firm value in millions of dollars. Dollar values are inflation-adjusted (June 1982) using the the Producer Price Index (PPI). Earnings Volatility is measured by the
standard deviation of first differences in EBITDA over the four years preceding the sample year, scaled by average assets for that period. Term Structure is the difference between the month-end
yields on a 10-year government bond and a 6-month government bond, matched to the month of a firm’s fiscal year end. Bond yields are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s economic
database (FRED). Each of the dummy variables (operating loss carryforwards, investment tax credit and debt rating) equals 1 if the firm has its respective items, 0 otherwise. Asterisks on the
means of REITs indicate whether they are significantly different from those of non-REITs. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 5% level, 1% level and 0.1% level, respectively.
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Pearson Correlation Matrix Among Measures of Dependent and Independent Variables for all firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(1) Debt Maturity 1
(2) Leverage 0.04 1
(3) SLOB 0.20*** 0.02 1
(4) REITs 0.14*** 0.05* 0.37*** 1
(5) Asset Maturity 0.08** 0.06* 0.24*** 0.08** 1
(6) Market/book 0.08** -0.43*** 0.12*** -0.01 0.03 1
(7) Abnorm. Earn. -0.05* 0.08*** -0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 1
(8) Firm Size 0.24*** -0.01 -0.10*** 0.22*** -0.19*** 0.15*** 0.02 1
(9) Volatility -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** 0.07** 0.07** -0.23*** 1
(10) Term Struct. -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 1
(11) Fixed Assets 0.23*** 0.08** 0.56*** 0.22*** 0.59*** 0.09*** 0 -0.10*** -0.14*** 0.03 1
(12) Profitability 0.10*** -0.12*** 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.07** -0.12*** 0.07** -0.21*** -0.08** 0.11*** 1
(13) Loss Carryfwd. -0.10*** 0.14*** -0.12*** -0.08** -0.03 -0.05* 0.04 -0.11*** 0.13*** 0.03 -0.13*** -0.18*** 1
(14) Tax Credit 0.02 -0.11*** 0.10*** 0.07** 0.02 -0.07** -0.03 -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 0.06* 0.10*** -0.17*** 1
(15) Debt Rating 0.17*** 0.03 -0.13*** 0.09*** -0.31*** -0.01 0.09*** 0.57*** -0.03 0.02 -0.24*** -0.01 0.04 -0.13*** 1
Table 3 The table reports Pearson correlation among dependent and independent variables of leverage and debt maturity for 201 firm-year observations for REITs between 1973 and 2011 from
Compustat Database. All variables are defined in Table 2. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 5% level, 1% level and 0.1% level, respectively.
Joint leverage and maturity choices in real estate firms: The role of the REIT status 17
2SLS Regression results for REIT and SLOB effects
Panel A REIT effect on joint leverage and maturity choice
1973-2006 1973-2011 2007-2008
VARIABLES Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity
SLOB 0.002 0.139*** -0.009 0.130*** 0.082 -0.016
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.12)
REIT 0.141 -0.098 0.173* -0.068 0.458** -0.644*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.30)
Market Leverage -0.187 -0.022 0.761
(0.25) (0.23) (0.43)
SLOB REIT LEV 0.303 0.217 0.839
(0.22) (0.18) (0.49)
Debt Maturity 0.096 0.065 0.275
(0.10) (0.09) (0.31)
SLOB REIT MAT -0.280* -0.288** -0.213
(0.12) (0.10) (0.35)
Observations 1,459 1,459 1,586 1,586 80 80
Panel B SLOB effect on joint leverage and maturity choice
1973-2006 1973-2011 2007-2008
VARIABLES Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity
SLOB -0.013 -0.276*** -0.061 -0.221*** -0.256 -0.043
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.50) (0.17)
Market Leverage -0.734*** -0.544** -0.080
(0.20) (0.17) (0.33)
SLOB LEV 0.970*** 0.814*** 0.249
(0.18) (0.16) (0.33)
Debt Maturity 3 0.055 -0.008 -0.521
(0.10) (0.09) (0.88)
SLOB MAT 0.033 0.115 0.618
(0.10) (0.10) (0.81)
Observations 1,270 1,270 1,385 1,385 72 72
Table 4 The table shows the two-stage least squares regression results with the coefficients for the main explana-
tory variables of interest over the three periods considered. The control variables outlined in Table 1 are included
in the estimation but the coefficients are not shown in the table since the discussion focuses on the REIT and
SLOB indicators and their interactions with leverage and maturity. Robust (clustered by firm) standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Year dummies are included in the maturity regression to capture latent changes in the
general economic environment. Significance is denoted as: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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2SLS Regression results for firm types separately
1973-2011 REITs Non-REITs
Variables Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity
Market Leverage 0.102 0.299*
(0.23) (0.15)
Debt Maturity -0.218* 0.006
(0.11) (0.08)
Asset Maturity 0.012 0.029**
(0.02) (0.01)
Market-to-book -0.133** 0.097 -0.136*** 0.063**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02)
Abnormal Earnings 0.084*** -0.036 0.004 -0.016
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Log of Firm Value 0.029** 0.056*** 0.005 0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Volatility -1.045** -1.202** -0.456*** -0.360*
(0.40) (0.43) (0.11) (0.14)
Term Structure 0.01 -0.009
(0.03) (0.02)
Debt Rated 0.109* 0.101**
(0.05) (0.03)
Fixed Assets Ratio 0.061 0.121**
(0.06) (0.04)
Profitability -0.185 -0.256**
(0.23) (0.08)
Net Operating Loss Dummy 0.096* 0.050**
(0.04) (0.02)
Investment Tax Credit Dummy -0.047 -0.067***
(0.04) (0.02)
Constant 0.580*** 0.382 0.566*** 0.111
(0.08) (0.21) (0.04) (0.11)
Observations 201 201 1,385 1,385
Table 5 The table shows the two-stage least squares regression results with the coefficients for the explanatory
variables over the three periods considered. Robust (clustered by firm) standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. Year dummies are included in the maturity regression to capture latent changes in the general economic
environment. Significance is denoted as: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
